In his book titled New British Fascism, Matthew Goodwin argues that support for the BNP is built on a legacy of earlier extreme right groups such as the National Front (2011). This toxic lineage is one of the reasons why the BNP enjoyed only a limited success in comparison with similar parties in Europe and why it has been difficult for the UK Independence Party to break though 1 (Goodwin 2011, Ford and Goodwin 2014) . In a contextual analysis of the leaked BNP membership list published by this journal Goodwin, Ford and Cutts show that historical party activism in the 1970s predicts BNP membership in the modern era (2013) . While Goodwin and colleagues look at supply-side explanations of extreme right success, here we focus on electoral demand for extreme right politics and its alleged continuity in space and time. As we are going to show, although there is a weak positive correlation between electoral 1 In some cases this connection proves to be less problematic. According to Duncan Morrow the Freedom Party of Austria has never fully rejected the historical legacy of the far right, engaging in conscious 'flirtations with former Nazis' and serving as 'a political vehicle for integrating former Nazis' while gaining wider political acceptance (2000) . British context is different because British national identity is largely build around the struggle against fascism and Nazism (Goodwin 2011). Hence, any links with neo-Nazi movement prove to be particularly toxic. In recent years we have seen a revival of the legacy hypothesis of extreme right support in the United Kingdom which asserts that contemporary extreme right parties are drawing on the legacy of activism from an earlier, more violent era (Goodwin, 2011) . As reported by Goodwin and colleagues this pattern has been observed in case of Vlaams Block in Antwerp and the Austrian Freedom Party in Carinthia, but also in Britain (Husbands 1983 , Goodwin, Ford, and Cutts 2013 , Mudde 2007 (Whitley 1979; Harrop, England, and Husbands 1980) while the BNP attracted older, less educated working-class men (Ford and Goodwin 2010) . This opens a possibility that supporters were partly recruited from the matured 'old guard' of the NF. Indeed, it has been shown that the BNP relied on existing networks of extreme right supporters and many activists, including the leadership, were previously engaged with the NF. . This raises the question whether extreme right organization ever stopped contributing to a local cultural legacy of intolerance in these regions.
As mentioned previously, supply-side explanations look at political opportunity structure and organizational factors. We have described the argument behind the supply-side legacy effect found by Goodwin and colleagues but does a similar legacy effect exist with respect to demand for extreme right parties? These two are arguably different from places where it received a modest score of less than 0.5 per cent of the vote because the former had much larger demand for extreme right politics and this should be accounted for in the model. Table 1 Regressions results are presented in Table 1 . We introduce a squared term to account for the existence of two distinct clusters. The NF vote does not reach statistical significance when it is regressed on its own together with a squared term and a binary variable for no candidate standing (Model 1). As expected the variable for no NF candidate standing is a positive predictor of the dependent variable, suggesting some residual level of previously untapped support. The results are similar when we introduce control variables (Model 2) that follow a pattern described in the literature, [ Table 2 and Table 3 
